This paper shows that access to finance is the crucial factor in explaining the link between the historical African slave trade and current GDP. We show: (1) The slave trade is strongly linked to current firm access to finance; (2) Among all the business obstacles a firm faces, the slave trade affects only access to finance; and (3) The slave trade erodes access to both formal credit and the trade credit thought to be its substitute. The results suggest a causal link between culture and finance that helps explain the pivotal role of both trust and finance in economic development. * We would like to thank
A well-developed literature in finance shows that firms that cannot access external finance forego profitable and welfare-enhancing investment opportunities.
1 If external finance is so important for firms and economic prosperity, why do we see so much variation in financial development? While a stream of literature has suggested institutional or political economy explanations for persistent financial underdevelopment, 2 we propose an explanation that draws on the long-term persistence of historical shocks to culture. We show that strong negative shocks to culture and trust in the past have a lasting deleterious impact on present day firm access to external finance.
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In this paper we use the slave trade in Africa to study how historically persistent crosscountry variation in culture shapes access to finance. Prior work has shown that countries with plausibly exogenous higher rates of slave extraction in the 15 th -19 th century have both lower levels of trust 4 as well as considerably lower GDP in the 20 th century (Nunn 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). 5 Our paper asks (1) Are historically high levels of slave extraction associated with higher barriers to external finance? (2) Do high levels of slave extraction associate with other quality dimensions of the business environment, or is the relationship with finance exceptional?
(3) Does informal credit effectively substitute for formal access to external finance in high slave extraction countries?
We examine this link by combining data on the African slave trade with country-level data from the World Bank's Doing Business Project (DBP) and firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WES). We first apply regression and instrumental variable models to the DBP that strongly support a causal relationship between the historical slave trade and current country-level heterogeneity in the financial climate in Africa. 6 We then use the WES data to show a strong negative relationship between the historical slave trade and the current firm-level access to external finance. The WES data measure firms' business activities and perceptions of the business climate between 2006-2009 for over 15,000 firms in 38 African countries. These firmlevel data show that access to external finance is limited by supply-side factors rather than by decreased demand. When asked for the most important reason for not applying for a loan, firms in high slave extraction countries were more likely to report having failed to acquire necessary financing due to factors that include cumbersome applications, excessive collateral requirements, and bribe requirements from bank officials. These firms were much less likely to say they did not apply for a loan due to a lack of need. This finding is inconsistent with an explanation that suggests low levels of external finance are demand driven. Our evidence suggests that the historical shock of the slave trade directly impacts the present-day access to finance that would allow firms to exploit potential investment opportunities.
We also examine whether the relationship between the slave trade and access to finance is exceptional among other obstacles a firm may face, or if the slave trade impacted all dimensions of the business environment. Using the DBP data, we show that while many dimensions of the business environment are correlated with national GDP in ways consistent with the prior literature, few of them are substantively linked to the country-level slave extraction found by
Nunn to predict GDP. For example, even though variation in GDP is strongly correlated with the difficulty of enforcing a contract, we find no substantial relationship between historical slave extraction and contract enforcement. The one consistent exception is the DBP measure that proxies for financial development. We find that both GDP and measures of slave extraction are strongly correlated with financial development in a way that other obstacles to firm operational effectiveness are not. The implication is that the relationship between the historical slave trade and finance is a first order mechanism in explaining variation in GDP, even relative to other firm transactions that might be sensitive to culture. 7 We next use the WES firm-level data to better understand the channels through which the slave trade has affected access to finance. This approach is similar to the household finance studies (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008) in its focus on micro-level data. We show that historical slave extraction at the country level strongly predict access to finance for firms through both the formal (bank loans) and informal financial sectors (such as supply chain credit or credit from friends and family). Although informal financial channels, often act as substitutes for inaccessible formal financial channels (Meltzer 1960; Fisman and Love 2003) , we find no evidence that firms in countries impacted by the slave trade are able to compensate for insufficient formal finance channels with credit from suppliers and customers.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we also examine variation in the use of sales credit across industry sectors to control for fixed differences across countries. If the historical slave truly impacts access to finance, we should observe those industries that depend on sales credit to be most affected by slave extraction. We first calculate the use of sales credit across sectors in South
Africa, which has Sub-Saharan Africa's best functioning credit markets. This allows us to calculate the dependence on sales credit across different industry sectors. The garment sector in South Africa, for example, heavily relies on sales credit (.474), while the hotel sector does not (.159).
Our analysis shows that in high slave extraction countries, these differences in sectoral sales credit usage are much smaller than in low slave extraction countries. Nigeria, which had high extraction levels, shows little difference between the use of sales credit in the garment sector (.178) and in hotels (.153). In contrast, low-extraction Botswana had large sectoral differences in use of sales credit between the garment sector (.413) and the hotel sector (.192 ). These results, conditional on country fixed effects, imply that the slave trade has, if anything, reduced the provision of informal credit in industries where it is most needed. This finding is particularly important because supplier and customer credit are key sources of finance in Africa and are known to be influenced by culture (Biggs, Raturi, and Srivastava 2002; Fafchamps 2000; Fisman 2001 ).
This paper contributes to several lines of research that suggest that the historical foundations of culture are linked to present day firm access to finance. One line of research has shown a strong correlation between individual levels of trust and financial contracting (Kotkin 1993; Greif 1997; McMillan 1997; McMillan and Woodruff 1999; Lyon 2000; Guiso et al. 2004; 2008) . The literature on trust and finance has been critical to understanding regional and national variation in financial practices, but has largely been limited to correlating individual self-reported trust with household financial decisions. 8 While our paper does not directly measure trust, it exploits rich plausibly exogenous cultural variation from the historical slave trade previously connected to both present day trust and GDP (Nunn 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011) . Furthermore, we connect this cultural variation to firm-level financial barriers, which allows us to establish the unique importance of finance in linking culture with economic growth.
Thus, this paper provides unique support for the increasing focus on trust by finance scholars (e.g. Sapienza and Zingales 2012).
We contribute to a second line of research that uses historical events to establish causal links to both culture and modern outcomes (La Porta et al. 1998; 1999; 2000; Glaeser and Shleifer 2002; Tabellini 2010 1997; Guiso et al. 2006; Algan and Cahuc 2010; Dohmen et al. 2012) , the historical persistence literature has typically focused on aggregates like GDP or outcomes such as self-reported levels of trust and investment in public goods. Very little attention has been paid to how these deep-rooted cultural explanations manifest themselves in firm behavior. This is important because business practices such as finance are a principal mechanism through which variation in GDP can be explained.
Finally, we contribute to an emerging literature on the relationship between culture and business practices, which economists have only recently begun to examine. Bloom et. al (2012) show trust levels in a multinational corporation's home country impact the decision rights given to local managers, while Bottazzi et al. (2011) examine national trust levels and venture capital investment decisions. Related work on bilateral national cultural differences has examined cross-8 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004; 2008) , for example, show that less trusting individuals are more likely to own stock and keep more of their wealth in cash. While important, these studies have few cultural observations and lack the rich variation provided by a large cross-country study. 9 See Nunn (2009) for a review of the multiple links between history and economic development.
border mergers (Ahern et al. 2012; Siegel et al. 2011), loans (Giannetti and Yafeh 2012) , and trade (Guiso et al. 2009 ). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is unique in this literature in both its focus on developing countries and its use of historical shocks to establish causality.
Section 1 provides a brief history of the slave trade in Africa and describes current access to finance in these countries. Section 2 describes our data and identification strategy. Section 3 presents our result. Section 4 concludes.
I. Historical and Cultural Context

A. Present Day Culture and the African Slave Trade
Between twelve and eighteen million Africans were sold into slavery between the fifteenth and the eighteenth century (Lovejoy 2000; Nunn 2010), depopulating the continent so severely that it may have lost 50% of its potential population by 1850 (Manning 1990) . Slaves were distributed and sold through four major trade routes. The trans-Saharan, Red Sea, and Indian
Ocean routes were the oldest, dating back to before A.D. 800. The transatlantic trade route, which emerged in the fifteenth century, ultimately became the largest in total volume. Although the majority of slaves in the early periods were kidnapped or taken as prisoners of war, the sourcing of slaves later shifted toward internecine conflict. Africans sold family members, friends, and community members to slave traders, both in exchange for goods or money and for fear that rivals would betray them first (Almada 1984; Mahadi 1992) .
The prevalence of betrayal in the slave trade created a culture of insecurity so severe that it extended even within families (Piot 1996) . Individuals preemptively betrayed community and family members to avoid being betrayed themselves, even forming alliances with merchants and raiders against community members (Barry 1992; Inikori 2003; Klein 2001 Their results are also consistent with trust as a mechanism for development, however. Studies of parochial trust and altruism in evolutionary psychology and behavioral economics (e.g. 
B. Culture and Access to Finance in Africa
There are several reasons to believe that firm access to finance is the exceptional link between the slave trade and the lack of economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. First, access to finance is a critical element for economic development (Rajan and Zingales 1998; Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar 2007) , particularly in the developing world. Second, extensive evidence
shows cultural elements such as trust play a major role in facilitating financial markets. Below, we detail existing literature on both relationships in Africa.
Access to finance in Africa through formal channels such as banks is a major constraint on economic activity. While over 80 percent of households in Western Europe and North
America have banking accounts (Beck et al. 2007 ), this number is less than 20 percent in sub-Saharan Africa (Beck et al. 2008 (Beck et al. 2008 ).
In the absence of formal institutional sources, individuals and firms in Africa access finance through informal channels. Friends, family, and ethnic networks play critical roles in Furthermore, trust may impact formal loans more indirectly by facilitating the development of stronger institutions that reduce financial obstacles (Putnam 1993; Beck et al. 2005a; 2005b) , although recent work suggests regulation may instead substitute for or diminish trust (Carlin et al. 2009; Aghion et al. 2010) . Given the lack of institutional development, the impact of this lack of finance on economic development in Africa has been severe ( Austen (1979 Austen ( , 1988 Austen ( , 1992 extraction. The majority of the missing countries are in North Africa, where slave extraction was relatively low. Others, including Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan, also had low slave extraction. Table 1a provides country-level summary statistics for the logged number of extracted slaves, per-capita GDP in 2009, and the key control variables that we will use in our empirical models. These statistics are presented for both the sample of countries covered by the DBP and the sample in the WES datasets, since the WES data covers only 38 countries. The first set of control variables represents country-level geographic and environmental characteristics that might influence economic development or health, and include longitude, distance from the equator, lowest monthly rainfall, maximum humidity, low temperature, coastline length (logged), and a dummy indicating the nation is an island. 12 We include dummy variables for important cultural factors that may also influence trust, institutions, or access to finance, including the percentage of
Islam adherence and a dummy for French legal origins, which have the worst protection for investors (La Porta et al. 1997) . 13 We include controls for natural resource wealth, using the average per capita production of gold, oil, and diamonds. Furthermore we present the minimum distance to the primary slave markets for the four slave trades, which will serve as instrumental variables later in the paper. (2012) for a discussion of the relationship between geography and economic development. 13 See La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 2000) for a discussion of the impact of legal origins on finance and development. 14 For a detailed description, see http://doingbusiness.org.
ubiquitous in the DBP survey, making the comparison of business obstacles as transparent as possible.
15 Table 2a presents summary statistics for the 15,276 firm responses from the WES for countries with slave extraction data. The survey provides key information on firm characteristics, including ownership, organizational structure, industry sector, age, and size. Firm size is defined in the WES by three categories: less than 20 employees, 21 to 99 employees, and 100 or more employees. We present the 14 sectors in which the firms are categorized, with retail and wholesale trade, manufacturing, and food as the most common. Table 2b presents self-reported financial practices for each firm, including the use of checking accounts, formal lines of credits, sales paid on delivery (i.e. lack of trade credit), and four mutually exclusive and exhaustive sources for working capital: internal funds, bank loans, supply chain credit, and other sources. Internal financing is the dominant form of finance, with informal supply chain credit and formal loans being substantially less common. We present selfreported access to finance as an obstacle to business, which is part of a larger set of 15 potential business obstacles subjectively measured on a five-point scale between 0 and 4. Based on the fivepoint scale in the WES, we define access to finance as an obstacle equal to one if it is reported as a minor (2), moderate (3), major (3) or severe (4) obstacle. 16 Approximately 74 percent of firms report access to finance as an obstacle. 17 We also present whether the firm applied for or needed a loan, as well the self-reported largest obstacles to accessing a loan: procedures too cumbersome, interest rates too high, too much collateral required, loan too small, informal payment (bribe) required, or anticipated rejection. 15 Our results from the Doing Business Project survey are very similar to what we find later using the World Enterprise Survey. 16 Zero represents no obstacle, 1 is a minor obstacle, 2 is a moderate obstacle, 3 is a major obstacle, 4 is a very severe obstacle. 17 We present the summary statistics for the other obstacles in Appendix Table A1 . Obstacles such as electricity, informal competition, taxes, political stability, and corruption are also reported as major problems. Courts and business licensing are perceived to be relatively less common problems.
Empirical Analysis
A. The Slave Trade and Development Constraints
Given the strong relationship between slave extraction and economic development in
Nunn (2008), 18 we first seek to understand which economic mechanisms might be driving this relationship. Economic development is known to be inhibited by a number of factors, including politics, weak institutions, courts, government corruption, education, and bureaucracy. While each of these might play some role in the heterogeneous development observed in Africa, we wish to better understand which might link the historical slave trade with recent development constraints. To do this, we examine the relationship of the ten country-level DBP variables presented in Table 1b with both per capita GDP and the number of slaves extracted. The goal of this analysis is understand which of these factors is related to both the historical slave extraction and the modern lack of economic development associated with it.
We first explore the simple relationships between each DBP variable and both the logged 19% of the variance explained. Slave extraction is negatively associated with credit information, 18 Since we rely heavily on Nunn (2008) to establish the economic importance of the historical slave trade, we first replicate his results using the subset of 38 countries for which we have data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey. Per capita GDP and area-adjusted slave extraction for these countries are presented in Figures 1a and 1b . Figure 1a presents a map of Africa with darker colors representing higher levels of GDP. Figure 1b presents the magnitude of slave extraction by country, with darker countries representing higher levels of slave extraction. We implement both his OLS and instrumental variable models. These results are presented and explained in Appendix Table A2 . Despite fewer country observations, we find nearly identical results, which reduces concerns that our smaller subsample constrained by the WES might be substantively different. For our subsample of countries, slave extraction levels are highly predictive of economic development over the 20 th century. 19 This is the last year the World Bank has data for all of the countries in our sample.
with 14% of the variance explained. In contrast, Figure 2 also presents the relationship between the cost of enforcing contracts and both GDP and slave extraction. While the cost of enforcing contracts is negatively associated with GDP, and explains 25% of the variance, there is no relationship with historical slave extraction. Contract enforcement costs cannot explain the relationship between slave extraction and GDP.
In Figure 3 we present the adjusted R-squared values from each set of DBP variable regressions. Points on the far right of the graph represent strong relationships between GDP and the specific business environment obstacles. Points that are high on the vertical axis represent strong relationships between slave extraction and the business environment obstacles. GDP is correlated with many of the business environment obstacles, including the depth of credit information index, the cost of starting a business, the cost of obtaining construction permits, the cost of enforcing a contract, the cost of resolving insolvency, and the cost of establishing an electrical connection. 20 Yet slave extraction is significantly correlated with only one obstacle---the depth of credit information index. The credit information environment is the only business environment characteristic associated with both historical slave extraction and modern day GDP.
We more formally test this using pairs of regressions with extensive country-level controls.
The baseline specifications are:
where ! represents the DBP variable for country k, ln (extract ! / ! ) is the natural log of the number of slaves extracted from country k between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area, and ln (GDP ! ) is the 2009 GDP for country k. Ck is a vector of dummy variables representing the European colonizer prior to independence, while Xk is a vector of geographic, climate, and cultural control variables. Coefficients for the slave extraction and GDP models are presented in Table A3 , both with and without control variables, with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Consistent with Figure 3 , only the credit information index is significantly correlated with both slave extraction and GDP. The only exception to this is higher deposits 20 The majority of these costs are driven by deposit size. necessary to get electricity, which also reflects reduced access to credit in high slave extraction countries.
We present a more detailed examination of the relationship between slave extraction and the depth of financial information index in Table 3 . Column (1) presents the uncontrolled model, while columns (2) and (3) add control variables. Historical slave extraction consistently predicts present day depth of credit information. Columns (4) -(6) implement the instrumental variables approach from Nunn (2008) to deal with the potential endogeneity of slave extraction.
The principal endogeneity concern is that the people historically living within current national boundaries may have endogenously selected into the slave trade based on pre-existing culture, and that those countries that these persistent cultural differences also impact modern access to finance. While Nunn's (2008) historical evidence that wealthy countries selected into the slave trade seems counter to this, we implement his instrumental variable model using the distance from each African country to the geographic location of each of the four major slave trades. 21 For these instruments to be valid, they must be correlated with slave extraction but uncorrelated with other country characteristics. The instruments must also be determinant of slave extraction, and not the opposite. Historical analysis shows that local natural resources determined local demand for slaves, including pearl diving in the Red Sea, salt mines in the Middle East, precious metals in South America, and agricultural plantations in the Caribbean and North America.
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Because our instruments are weak, with only 50 observations (3<F-stats<5), we implement Moreira's (2003) conditional likelihood correction of confidence intervals (Andrews, Moreira, and Stock 2006) . This correction provides the set of parameter estimates that cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level. 23 We present the second stage results for the IV models in columns (4) -(6) of Table 3 , with 95% confidence intervals. The IV models are generally consistent with the base OLS models, finding a negative relationship between slave extraction and credit information. Importantly, in column (6) 
B. Firm-Level Obstacles to Finance
We next use the WES data from 37 countries to examine whether firms in high slave extraction countries report difficulties accessing external finance. 24 We explore these relationships in more depth using a series of linear probability models, where the dichotomous self-report of access to finance as a business obstacle is regressed on the logged number of extracted slaves (normalized by geographic area) and a series of country-and firm-level controls. The baseline specification is:
where !"# is a dummy variable indicating that respondent i in country k in year t views the business obstacle as a major or severe obstacle, and ln (extract ! / ! ) is the natural log of the number of slaves extracted from country k between 1400 and 1900 normalized by land area. Ck is a vector of dummy variables representing the European colonizer prior to independence, while Xk is a vector of geographic, climate, and cultural control variables. Zi is a vector of industry sector dummies interacted with each of the three firm size dummies as well as a linear term for firm age.
Coefficients for the area-adjusted slave extraction are presented in Table 4 , with standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. The first column reports estimates without any control variables, while the second column adds the industry and firm-size controls. The third columns add colonizer controls, while the fourth column presents the fully-controlled model. Column (5) collapses the data to the country level, and reruns the fully-controlled model.
In each model, country-level slave extraction is positively related to managers reporting access to finance as an obstacle.
25 Columns (6) - (8) repeat the instrumental variables models using the Moreira (2003) weak instrument correction, and continue to report a positive relationship between slave extraction and the obstacle of accessing finance.
24 There are no data for self-reported access to finance from Nigeria. 25 Because we are concerned that our dichotomous dependent variables were strategically constructed from the survey's five-point scale, we use alternative cutoffs for finance as a business obstacle. One model defines the obstacle dummies as equal to one only if the respondent labeled the obstacle as severe (4). Another defines an obstacle as minor or greater (1-4). Both models produce positive and statistically significant coefficients for slave extraction.
In contrast, models predicting nine other self-reported business obstacles in the WES survey (access to electricity, access to transportation, land access, informal sector competition, courts, tax rates, business licensing, political stability, and corruption) found no significant relationship with slave extraction, and are reported in the Appendix Table A3 . As in the DBP data, the link between the historical slave trade and access to finance is exceptional.
C. Access to Formal and Informal Credit
The results from Table 4 suggest that slave extraction had a major long-term impact on economic development by reducing access to finance. To further investigate this hypothesized link, we next investigate specific financial channels that might be affected by this history. More specifically, we want to understand if the impact of the slave trade on finance was through both formal and informal financial channels.
To do so, we repeat our OLS models from Table 4 using self-reported financial practices as our dependent variables. Rows 1 and 2 show that firms in countries with high slave extraction are much less likely to have formal checking accounts or formal lines of credit. Row 3 suggests that the percentage of sales paid on delivery, which reflects a lack of trade credit, is higher in high slave extraction countries, although the statistical significance is not robust to all specifications.
Rows 4-7 examines the percentage of working capital from four mutually exclusive and exhaustive sources: internal funds, bank loans, supply chain credit, and other sources. Firms in high slave extraction countries are more likely to rely on internal funds (row 4), and less likely to rely on bank loans (row 5), consistent with our earlier results. Furthermore, in the absence of the formal credit such as bank loans, they appear to be less likely to have access to informal credit through either supply chain credit (row 6) or family or friends (row 7), which is significant because informal credit such as supplier credit is believed to substitute for formal credit (Meltzer
1960; Fisman and Love 2003).
The results from these seven models strongly support the hypothesis that slave extraction had a long-term impact on access to multiple channels of finance. Firms in high slave extraction countries are far more likely to rely on internal cash for investment, since they appear to have less access to a myriad of channels for credit. This reduced access includes credit through both financial institutions (i.e., loans, lines of credit, checking accounts) and trade relationships (i.e.
supplier and customer credit).
D. Reasons for Finance Obstacles
Our previous regressions have identified that historical slave extraction is strongly linked to access to financing obstacles, which are known to severely restrict economic development.
While these results are consistent with a story that the supply of financing is restricted by cultural factors such as mistrust, it is possible that the lower use of financing reflects reduced demand due to lack of economic development in these countries (Bigsten et al. 2003) . We next show that the use of credit is restricted by the supply of credit, not demand for credit.
We first repeat our OLS models from Tables 4 and 5 , regressing a dummy variable indicating whether a firm purchased an asset in the previous year on area-adjusted country-level slave extraction and our full set of control variables. While we find no consistently significant relationship in row 1 of Table 6 , in row 2 we find that conditional on purchasing an asset, it is much more likely that it was purchased using internal capital. If the constraints were solely driven by the demand side, we would not expect this result.
We then regress a dummy variable indicating whether the firm applied for credit in the previous year on area-adjusted country-level slave extraction and our full set of control variables.
The results for these regressions, presented in row 3 of Table 6 , show lower levels of credit applications in countries with high slave extraction. To test whether this lower credit application frequency reflects decreased demand, we next examine the self-reported reasons for those firms who chose not to apply for a loan. It is important to note that because firms were asked to choose only the most important reason, these answers are mutually exclusive. Row 4 shows that the same high-extraction countries with low credit usage are less likely to report no need for loans, which suggests that the decreased number of applications is not due to lower demand, but rather to expectations of higher loan costs or lower expectation of application success. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that among firms that did not list access to finance as difficult (see Table 2b ), 65% reported no need for a loan, compared to 32% of those reporting finance as a business obstacle. Similarly, 86% of the very large companies (over 500 employees) without loans reported no need for a loan, compared with 39% of smaller firms.
To examine which supply-side factors might be limiting access to credit, we restrict our sample to the 11,596 respondents who indicated they did not apply and examined the selfreported primary reason for this. We examined several reasons for not applying: if applications were too cumbersome, if loan interest rates were too expensive, if loans required excessive collateral, if loans were too small, if loans required informal payments (i.e. bribing bank officers), or if the firm never applied because it anticipated rejection. Each was represented by a dummy variable indicating whether it was the primary reason for not having a loan, which was then regressed on slave extraction and our full set of controls
We present these regressions in rows 5-10 of Table 6 . Row 5 shows that loan applications in high slave extraction countries are perceived to be too cumbersome, while row 6 shows too much collateral in such countries was needed to secure the loan. Row 7 indicates that loans that were offered in high slave extraction countries were too small. While row 8 indicates no relationship between slave extraction countries and the formal interest rates or prices of loans, row 9 indicates a strong relationship between slave extraction and the need to bribe bank officers.
Row 10 indicates that managers in high slave extraction countries had no higher expectation of rejection.
These results suggest that supply-side factors are raising the cost of accessing credit. These costs do not appear to be primarily from higher interest rates, however, but are instead due to two factors. First, banks appear to require more extensive information and collateral in order to approve the loan, and even then offer insufficient funds. Second, accessing bank credit requires bribing corrupt loan officers. Thus, while concern over government corruption as an obstacle to doing business may not be higher in high slave extraction countries (see Table A4 ), 27 corruption within banks appears to be driving up the costs of credit in ways that impede financing and growth. These results are consistent with a broad literature suggesting corruption inhibits economic development (Fisman 2001; Olken 2007; Reinikka and Svensson 2004) , but show that corruption is not limited to government functions.
E. Sector-Specific Effects Within Countries
All of our previous regressions have identified the impact of the slave trade of access to finance at the country level. These results could be explained either by persistent country-level cultural aspects directly impacted by the slave trade, or alternatively by institutional differences that developed in response to heterogeneous extraction levels. In order to disentangle these possible mechanisms, we examine within-country differences in the slave trade-finance relationship using the approach from Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
In this approach, we first identify sector-level and firm size effects on specific financial channels in the most frictionless financial market in Africa: South Africa. We do so by regressing the WES access to finance variables on interactions between the sectors listed in Table 2a and a dummy for firm size.
where !"# is a variable indicated in Table A5 . Zi is a vector of industry sector dummies interacted with each of the three firm size dummies as well as a linear term for firm age. The observations and adjusted r-squared values are listed in Table A -5. Of the many access to finance variables used in earlier regressions, only trade credit is significantly explained by sector and size factors.
Consequently, we use percentage paid with sales credit to estimate industry-specific effects of the slave trade across Africa.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we regress individual sales credit responses across
Africa on country-level slave extraction levels and the predicted values from the sales credit 27 The advantage of using the self-reported measures is that they are comparable across different obstacles to business. Tests of significance can be conducted by looking at the overlapping confidence intervals. In general we find strong to suggestive results for differences between finance and the other obstacles with the exception of access to electricity and political instability, the latter of which is very imprecisely estimated. 28 South Africa has the lowest reported level of access to finance as a business obstacle in the WES data, as well as the top ranking in "getting credit" and "protecting investors" in the Doing Business Project. Furthermore, its size provides sufficient observations in the WES data to estimate sector-specific effects in access to finance. regression in Table A-5 . Column 1 in Table 7 presents the basic model without interaction, while columns 2-4 present models that interact sector-specific dependence with slave extraction. In column 1 we see that South African sectors where sales credit is more common strongly predict sales credit in other countries. Furthermore, slave extraction has a much stronger negative effect on sales credit access for firms in those sectors that heavily supply this type of financing. Column 5 further adds fixed effects for country and sector/size, and this interaction term remains significantly negative, while column 6 replaces the continuous (log of area-adjusted) slave extraction variable with a dummy for above-median extraction levels. These fixed effect regressions show that even within-country, historical slave extraction appears to more significantly impact the access to finance of those firms that heavily depend on trade credit.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that firms play a critical role in tying historicallybased culture to economic development. While development may be influenced by a number of factors, access to finance seems to play a unique role as the link between the historical slave trade and economic development. Our historical persistence approach suggests a causal link that between culture and finance that is helpful in interpreting the body of previously-observed correlations.
We are also able to show that the historic slave trade impacts access to finance through both formal and informal channels. Formal channels such as bank loans and lines of credit are inaccessible to the firms that need them. Low use of credit in countries with histories of high slave extraction is a function of supply-based shortages, not a lack of demand. In informal trade channels, neither customers nor suppliers are willing to extend credit, requiring payment-ondelivery that might reduce the frequency of transactions and the magnitude of investment.
Consequently, supplier and customer credit does not supplement formal credit shortages in ways that might support critical investment in developing countries. Our ability to implement country fixed-effect models for trade credit shows that even within common institutional settings, industry sectors that depend on informal credit channels are more heavily impacted by the longterm impact of the slave trade than others.
While we cannot specifically observe which cultural mechanisms might link the historical slave trade with access to finance, prior work strongly suggests that mistrust plays a critical role in this link (Nunn 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011) . Furthermore, an extensive body of research links trust to historical shocks, finance, and development, providing circumstantial evidence for trust as the mechanism behind the slave trade-finance link. In fact, given the extensive literature detailed earlier, the link between access to finance and both development and trust would not be surprising. A folk critique of the trust and finance literature argues that since trust impacts every transaction (e.g. Arrow 1972; Granovetter 1985) , finance is not exceptional.
But our finding that it appears to be the only critical link in Africa between a historical shock to culture and GDP emphasizes the importance of finance as a driver of economic growth and exchange, as well as the special role of firms in the development process. Note: Self-reported access to finance question not asked in Nigeria. 1 indicates finance is either a minor, moderate, major, or severe obstacle. 0 indicates finance is not an obstacle. Other sources of working capital can include family, friends, and non-bank financial institutions. % of asset purchased with retained earnings is conditional on purchasing an asset. Self-reported data on reasons for not seeking a loan in the prior year are conditional on not receiving a loan.
Independent variables Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the country level (Selfreported access to finance question not asked in Nigeria). Specifications 6-8 report the Moriera conditional likelihood ratio intervals for the 95% confidence level for instrumental variables with weak instruments. The f-statistic on the first stage regressions are consistently less than 10, which implies we have a weak instruments problem.
We use the Moriera (2003) conditional likelihood ratio test that provides a set of parameter estimates that would not be rejected at the 95% percentile confidence level.
The actual value of the parameter estimate is ambiguous in this case, so we use limited information maximum likelihood point estimate from Moriera (2003) Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level (38 clusters). See Table 2b for the number of observations. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level (38 clusters). See Table 2b for the number of observations. Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level (37 clusters). We use a regression within South Africa to predict sector / firm size effects on sales credit extension in the most frictionless large economy in Africa. We then extend the predictions from the within South Africa regression to the other 37 countries to create "Predicted sector / firm size effect on sales credit". Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses (see Table 1B for number of observations) Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level (38 clusters, except for the self-reported access to finance which has 37 clusters). 
